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Bank of Canada Communication, Media Coverage, 
and Financial Market Reactions 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the literature, central bank communication is identified via either (i) the written content of 
original  communications  or  (ii)  newswire  reports.  We  examine  how  (i)  Bank  of  Canada 
communications and (ii) media reporting on them impacts Canadian bond and stock market 
returns using a GARCH model over the period 1998–2006. Official communications exert a 
relatively larger influence on the bond market, whereas media coverage is more relevant for 
the stock market. In general, media filtering does not appear to play a prominent role. 
 
JEL:   E52, G14, G15 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent literature, central bank communication is identified via either (i) (the interpretation 
of)  newswire  reports  (e.g.,  Ehrmann  and  Fratzscher,  2007)  or  (ii)  the  written  content  of 
original communications (e.g., Hayo et al., 2008). Financial markets react noticeably when 
either identification channel is used. In the case of Federal Reserve (Fed) communications, 
there is preliminary evidence that “financial market news is not necessarily created at the 
time when the information becomes available, but comes into existence only after it goes 
through  a  filtering  process  by  the  media”  (Hayo  et  al.,  2008,  21–22).  Individual  news 
recipients seemingly ignore relevant information, probably because it is too costly to acquire, 
and depend on information filters to cope with the flood of daily information.
1 
In this paper, we explore differences in financial market reaction to newswire reports 
and  original  communications.  Canada  is  an  interesting  country  for  a  case  study  since 
communications by the Bank of Canada (BOC) are well documented. Furthermore, Canada 
has  advanced  financial  markets,  a  fact  that  should  ensure  frequent  coverage  of  monetary 
policy  events  by  news  agencies.  Hayo  and  Neuenkirch  (2010)  show  that  BOC 
communications exert a significant and economically relevant impact on Canadian financial 
market  returns.  Their  approach  implicitly  assumes  that  financial  markets  automatically 
process news at the time the information becomes available. We extend their data set and 
analyse all types of BOC communications and media reporting on them (Reuters, The Globe 
and  Mail,  National  Post,  and  Canadian  Press)  regarding  monetary  policy  and  economic 
outlook. 
We address two specific research questions: (1) To what extent is Canadian central 
bank communication covered by the media? (2) Does media coverage initiate larger reactions 
on Canadian bond and stock markets than the original communications? To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to systematically compare the financial market impact of (i) original 
communications, (ii) reports on these communications in leading national newspapers, and 
(iii) international news agency coverage of same. 
 
II. DATA 
We start with the same data set used in Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010). Coding of the dummy 
variables for the Canadian economic outlook communications is either “positive” (EO+) or 
“negative” (EO–); “tightening” (MP+) or “easing” (MP–) are the categories for monetary 
policy  communications.  There  are  12  communication  dummies  as  each  type  of 
                                                 
1  Sims  (2003)  provides  a  theoretical  framework  for  information-processing  constraints  in  macroeconomic 
models. 4 
communication (statements, monetary policy reports, congressional hearings and speeches) 
can be coded into four different categories (EO+, EO–, MP+, MP–). The data set is extended 
by  including  the  world’s  largest  newswire  agency,  Reuters,  and  three  major  Canadian 
newspapers: The Globe and Mail, National Post (formerly Financial Post), and Canadian 
Press. Over the sample period of January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2006, we systematically 
review the daily announcements available on the respective websites. We collect new stories 
if they concern Bank of Canada communications related to economic outlook or monetary 
policy inclination. Figure 1 provides an overview of how central bank communication days 
and media coverage days are distributed over the sample period. 
 
FIGURE 1: Communication Days vs. Coverage Days 
 
There  is  slightly  more  media  coverage  about  communication  (142;  represented  by 
transparent  bars  in  Figure  1)  than  original  communication  events  themselves  (116; 
represented by black bars), but the original events are more uniformly distributed over the 
sample period. There are two phases during which Canadian central bank communication 
received relatively intense media attention. The first one is from Q2-1999 to Q3-2000, which 
is the period before the BOC introduced a fixed schedule of interest rate decision days (fixed 
announcement  dates).  During  this  period,  financial  market  agents  (and  the  media)  were 
uncertain as to which day the BOC would change its target for the overnight rate. The second 
phase of intensified coverage is from Q2-2005 to Q4-2005. During this time span, there was 
great uncertainty about when and to what extent the BOC would re-join the Fed’s tightening 
cycle. 
In our analysis, we differentiate between the original source and media coverage by 
Reuters and the major newspapers.
2 We check whether (1) there is no media coverage of 
                                                 
2 As there are very few observations for some categories in a particular newspaper, we construct summary 
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original  communication,  (2)  the  coverage  matches  the  original  source,  (3)  the  coverage 
deviates from the original source (shows an obviously different interpretation than the original 
wording), or (4) the coverage is an exclusive report of central bank communication insofar as 
there is no original communication on either the reporting day or the day before.
3 Thus, in the 
case of Reuters and newspaper coverage, we differentiate between ‘matching’, ‘deviant’, and 
’exclusive’ and assign these the same subcategories used for sorting original communications 
(EO+, EO–, MP+, MP–).
4 
 
III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our Canadian financial market indicators comprise daily closing interest rates on government 
securities and daily returns on stock markets for the period January 1998 through December 
2006. We study daily changes in three-month, six-month, and one-year Treasury bills and 
two-year Treasury notes and rates of change on the Toronto Stock Exchange Index (TSX). A 
GARCH(1,1) specification  with  t-distributed errors  (Engle, 1982;  Bollerslev, 1986)  is  the 
starting point of our analysis. It is then simplified in a consistent general-to-specific testing-
down process (Hendry, 1995) at a 5% significance level to increase estimation efficiency.
5 
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where a0, a1, b1, m,  g, d, z, h, q,  and i are parameters or vectors of parameters and et|Gt–1 = 
t(v). Gt–1 captures all information up to t–1, and t(v) is a t-distribution with v degrees of 
freedom. The vector of financial controls contains lagged returns, Canadian and U.S. stock 
and bond returns, and CAD/USD and CAD/EUR spot market returns. Other control variables 
are changes in Canadian and U.S. target rates, the surprise component of several commonly 
watched macroeconomic announcements from both countries,  and an impulse dummy for 
                                                 
3 Media coverage does not necessarily have to be preceded by an official communication documented on the 
BOC website. News agencies and newspapers sometimes refer to informal interviews by central bank officials or 
provide analyses of past minutes and forecasts. 
4 In case of deviant coverage, MP+ (MP–) implies a tighter (easier) monetary policy stance than provided by the 
original communication, whereas EO+ (EO–) refers to a brighter (worse) economic outlook. 
5 Diagnostic testing of preliminary OLS estimations reveals significant ARCH effects. The final GARCH(1,1) 
models sufficiently remove these ARCH effects. 6 
9/11.
6 Contemporaneous returns are excluded to avoid simultaneity problems. Bank of Canada 
communications and media coverage variables enter the equation when they actually hit the 
market. For example, a speech (or a newswire report about  a speech)  made  after market 
closure hits the market the following day. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Table  1  shows  the  reaction  of  Canadian  bond  and  stock  market  returns  to  central  bank 
communication and its media coverage.
7 All coefficients of the BOC communications not 
covered in the media show the expected sign, whereas signs of several coverage variables are 
counterintuitive. Communication (newspaper) variables are relatively more important on bond 
(stock) markets. On bond markets, media coverage is relevant when it provides an obviously 
different interpretation than suggested by the official communication. On the stock market, 
media information is particularly influential when it exclusively reports monetary policy news, 
i.e., when there is no BOC communication on either the reporting day or the day before. 
It is unclear whether the original source or its coverage in the media has a statistically 
larger  impact  across  all  markets.  Moreover,  in  terms  of  financial  market  impact,  the 
coefficient estimates presented above could be misleading, as some types of news appear 
more frequently than others. Therefore, we compare the impact by taking into account the 
frequency of news (i.e., the number of events per indicator). Table 2 shows the cumulative 
impact on returns per category on each market in our sample. 
Official central bank communication has a greater cumulative impact across all bond 
maturities than the other news sources—even when it is not picked up by the media. This is 
particularly evident for the longer maturities, where its impact is at least three times higher 
than that of media coverage. In contrast, the stock market’s reaction is largely dominated by 
relevant  reports  in  major  national  newspapers.  Finally,  Reuters  coverage  does  not  figure 
prominently in the transmission of BOC communications to Canadian financial markets. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In  this  paper,  we  explore  the  differences  in  reaction  to  newswire  reports  and  original 
communication, using Canada as a case study. We examine the impact of all types of BOC 
                                                 
6 Data sources: Bond and foreign exchange market series: Federal Reserves’ Statistical Releases H15 and Bank 
of Canada’s statistical database; stock market series: Datastream. Surveys of macroeconomic announcements: 
Bloomberg newswire. 
7 The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: –0.026 (–0.58) denotes a decrease of 2.6 (58) bps in three-month 
interest rates (TSX index) after a negative economic outlook in a monetary policy report. 7 
communications and media reporting on them (Reuters, The Globe and Mail, National Post, 
and Canadian Press) on Canadian bond and stock market returns using a GARCH model. 
 
TABLE 1: Regression Estimates for Bond and Stock Market Returns 
   3-Month     6-Month     1-Year     2-Years     TSX 
Newspaper                                           
Exclusive MP +        0.018  **              –0.50  * 
Exclusive MP –                          1.17  ** 
Exclusive EO +                          0.44  ** 
Exclusive EO –                          –1.13  ** 
Deviant MP Tighter  0.012  **           0.022  *                   
Deviant MP Easier        0.072  **  0.091  **  0.123  **  –0.84  ** 
Deviant EO Worse                             –0.087  **       
Matching MP +  –0.014  **  –0.012  **                    –0.68  ** 
                             
Reuters                             
Exclusive MP –  0.012  **                                  
Deviant MP Tighter  0.017  **                                  
Deviant EO Brighter  0.044  **                    –2.11  ** 
Deviant EO Worse  –0.015  **  –0.036  **  –0.072  **           –0.55  * 
Matching MP +                             0.022  *          
Matching EO –  –0.017  **           –0.059  **  –0.059  **       
                             
No Media Coverage                             
Statement MP +                                      –0.46  ** 
Statement EO +        0.026  *    0.036  **  0.039  **     
Statement EO –           –0.038  **  –0.064  **  –0.071  **       
MPR EO +                    0.023  **     
MPR EO –  –0.026  **  –0.041  **  –0.062  *    –0.058  **  –0.58  ** 
Speech/Test. MP +  0.019  **  0.025  **  0.043  **                
Speech/Test. MP –  –0.010  **  –0.026  **  –0.022  **  –0.047  **     
Speech/Test. EO +                    0.031  **     
Speech/Test. EO –           –0.031  **  –0.042  **  –0.047  **  –0.34  * 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Number of observations: 2,169. Robust standard errors 
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992) are used. Only the variables of interest of the reduced model resulting from 
the testing-down process are listed. Full tables are available upon request. EO = Economic Outlook; MP = 
Monetary Policy. 
 
TABLE 2: Cumulative Absolute Returns for Bond and Stock Markets 
   3-Month     6-Month     1-Year     2-Years     TSX 
Newspaper  0.15     0.46     0.49     0.72     25.9 
Reuters  0.23     0.07     0.38     0.42     3.2 
No Media Coverage  0.42     2.07     3.14     3.87     12.8 
Note: The figures are calculated by taking the absolute estimates from Table 1, which are then multiplied by the 
respective frequency of news and aggregated into the three sources (newspapers, Reuters, original source). 8 
BOC  communications  are  rather  uniformly  distributed  over  the  sample  period, 
whereas  media coverage is  particularly high during two phases  of heightened uncertainty 
about the future course and timing of Canadian monetary policy. In the case of the bond 
market,  more  BOC  communication variables  cause a significant  reaction, whereas on the 
stock  market,  newspapers  dominate.  Media  coverage  is  notably  relevant  when  its 
interpretation of the BOC communication deviates from the original wording or when it is an 
exclusive  report  about  central  bank  communication.  Reuters  coverage  does  not  play  a 
prominent role in the transmission of central bank communication across Canadian financial 
markets. 
In general, media filtering plays a less prominent role in Canada than it does in the 
United  States  (see  Hayo  et  al.,  2008),  with  the  exception  of  the  stock  market.  Canadian 
market  participants  directly  monitor  central  bank  communication  and  do  not  rely  on 
newspapers  or  news  agencies  for  information.
8  There  are  at  least  two  crucial  differences 
between Canadian and U.S. central bank communication that might explain the difference in 
findings for these countries. First, the Bank of Canada has a clear inflation-targeting mandate, 
whereas the Federal Reserve Bank has more discretion as to monetary policy due to its dual 
mandate. The inflation target makes monetary policy more predictable and thus attracts less 
media attention. Second, Bank of Canada officials use communication less frequently than do 
their Fed counterparts. Figure 2 compares Canadian communication days (black bars) and 
U.S.  communication  days  (transparent  bars).  Market  participants  in  the  United  States  are 
flooded  with  official  communications  from  members  of  the  Fed  and,  therefore,  rely  on 
newswire  filtering,  whereas  Canadian  market  participants  can  quite  easily  monitor  BOC 
communication without the aid of filtering. 
Canadian financial markets move in the intended direction after BOC communications 
and the communications do not require media filtering. Therefore, from the findings of this 
paper, it is not clear whether the BOC should alter its communication strategy.
9 
   
                                                 
8 This paper does not provide a clear answer as to when and why financial market agents directly monitor central 
bank communication or rely on newswire services. This question could be addressed by a survey of financial 
market participants, an endeavour we leave for future research. 
9 However, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2011) show that the more frequent Fed communications outperform BOC 
communications in explaining Canadian interest rate decisions. Thus, the BOC might consider increasing its 
frequency of communication to ensure that private markets are able to form precise expectations of interest rate 
decisions. 9 
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